What is the right paradigm for professional ethics? According to Mike Martin, there is a received or dominant one—he calls this the consensus paradigm—in which professional ethics is reducible to duties and dilemmas. It consists of identifying the duties that are or should be standardized within professional codes of ethics applicable to all members of a profession, and grappling with how to apply the duties to particular situations where they conflict or have unclear implications. Martin rejects this as (...) “implausible and constricting”. His counterproposal is that professional ethics be expanded to include personal commitments and ideals. By “ideals” he means “commitments to forms of goodness around which individual character is formed and which are not reduced to general duties,” and by “personal” he “means that they shape the work of individuals without necessarily being incumbent on all members of a profession”. (shrink)

Plagiarism is increasingly evident in business and academia. Though links between demographic, personality, and situational factors have been found, previous research has not used actual plagiarism behavior as a criterion variable. Previous research on academic dishonesty has consistently used self-report measures to establish prevalence of dishonest behavior. In this study we use actual plagiarism behavior to establish its prevalence, as well as relationships between integrity-related personal selection and workplace deviance measures. This research covers new ground in two respects: (a) That (...) the academic dishonesty literature is subject to revision using criterion variables to avoid self bias and social desirability issues and (b) we establish the relationship between actual academic dishonesty and potential workplace deviance/white-collar crime. (shrink)

Plagiarism is increasingly evident in business and academia. Though links between demographic, personality, and situational factors have been found, previous research has not used actual plagiarism behavior as a criterion variable. Previous research on academic dishonesty has consistently used self-report measures to establish prevalence of dishonest behavior. In this study we use actual plagiarism behavior to establish its prevalence, as well as relationships between integrity-related personal selection and workplace deviance measures. This research covers new ground in two respects: (a) That (...) the academic dishonesty literature is subject to revision using criterion variables to avoid self bias and social desirability issues and (b) we establish the relationship between actual academic dishonesty and potential workplace deviance/white-collar crime. (shrink)

This introduction to contemporary social and political theory examines the impact of new ideas such as feminist theory, poststructuralism, hermeneutics and critical theory. The innovations brought by these intellectual traditions of Europe and America are outlined and discussed. Rather than focus on individual thinkers, the authors take a "conceptual" approach by examining contemporary theories through themes such as "critique", "rationality", "power", "the subject", "the body", and "culture". Each chapter considers the evolution of a concept and examines the major debates and (...) transformations that have taken place in that area. (shrink)

C. Lloyd Morgan is mostly known for Morgan’s canon, still a popular and frequently quoted principle in comparative psychology and ethology. There has been a fair amount of debate on the canon’s interpretation, function, and value regarding the research on animal minds, usually referring to it as an isolated principle. In this paper we rather shed light on Morgan’s overall scientific program and his vision for comparative psychology. We argue that within his program Morgan identified crucial conceptual, ontological, and (...) methodical issues, that are still fundamental to the current research on animal minds. This also highlights a new aspect of his role as one of the “founding fathers” of modern comparative psychology. In order to understand Morgan’s program, we briefly outline the historical context in which he began his work on a science of comparative psychology. We will then emphasize to what extent his taxonomy of psychological capacities, the development of his metaphysics for a comparative psychology, and his newly introduced interdisciplinary procedures justify Morgan’s distinctive approach to still rather sensitive issues. In doing so, we aim to provide a more comprehensive picture of Morgan’s methodological signature and we contend that a proper understanding of his canon can only be gained by taking it as part of this program. We finally understand his most renown considerations as part of his struggle to ascertain the limits and possibilities of the discipline he contributed to set up, and thus emphasize the need to keep the discussion going, notably on the accessibility of other minds than one’s own and on the limits of one’s research perspectives. (shrink)

This introduction to the Common Knowledge symposium titled “Comparative Relativism” outlines a variety of intellectual contexts where placing the unlikely companion terms comparison and relativism in conjunction offers analytical purchase. If comparison, in the most general sense, involves the investigation of discrete contexts in order to elucidate their similarities and differences, then relativism, as a tendency, stance, or working method, usually involves the assumption that contexts exhibit, or may exhibit, radically different, incomparable, or incommensurable traits. Comparative studies are required to (...) treat their objects as alike, at least in some crucial respects; relativism indicates the limits of this practice. Jensen argues that this seeming paradox is productive, as he moves across contexts, from Lévi-Strauss's analysis of comparison as an anthropological method to Peter Galison's history of physics, and on to the anthropological, philosophical, and historical examples offered in symposium contributions by Barbara Herrnstein Smith, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, Marilyn Strathern, and Isabelle Stengers. Comparative relativism is understood by some to imply that relativism comes in various kinds and that these have multiple uses, functions, and effects, varying widely in different personal, historical, and institutional contexts that can be compared and contrasted. Comparative relativism is taken by others to encourage a “comparison of comparisons,” in order to relativize what different peoples—say, Western academics and Amerindian shamans—compare things “for.” Jensen concludes that what is compared and relativized in this symposium are the methods of comparison and relativization themselves. He ventures that the contributors all hope that treating these terms in juxtaposition may allow for new configurations of inquiry. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Scotus’s claim that the categories are the subject of a propter quid science. In order to see the significance of this claim, I first trace the development of the idea that the categories are the subject of a science from Martin of Denmark, Peter of Auvergne, and Simon of Faversham. I then turn toDuns Scotus’s account of the categories as the subject of a propter quid science. Throughout the discussion, I concentrate on the fundamental (...) problems confronting anyone who claims that there is a science of the categories: namely, how they, being ten, can have an appropriate unity. Scotus, as we will see, will answer this problem by claiming that the intellect causes a greater unity in second intentions than the corresponding unity that exists in the world. As a consequence, Scotus contends that the categories are the subject of a propter quid science, one that is radically different from the science of metaphysics. (shrink)

The nature and legitimacy of commitments. Objectivity vs. commitment, by H. Smith. Institutional commitment: a social scientist's view, by H. R. Davis. The sectarian nature of liberal education, by L. J. Averill. The identity of the Christian college, by W. W. Jellema.--Commitments and the dimensions of learning. Discursive truth and evangelical truth, by A. C. Outler. Natural order and transcendent order, by W. G. Pollard. Limited cognition and ultimate cognition, by R. W. Friedrichs. Academic teaching and human experience, by M. (...) Novak. Academic excellence and moral value, by W. W. Jellema.--Norms and models of commitment. Biblical realism as a norm, by W. Herberg. Christian ethical community as a norm, by W. Beach. A pluralistic model, by W. B. Martin. A singular model, by L. J. Averill. (shrink)

Once Alexander of Aphrodisias revived the Peripatetic philosophy in the late secondcentury CE, Aristotle's surviving corpus became the guiding texts for a philosophicalschool, and, like any school, the Aristotelian one tried to systematize and dogmatizeits founder's teachings into a coherent and comprehensive approach to everything. Thisway of reading Aristotle was the dominant one through the Islamic and Christian Middle Ages, although occasionally a dissenter might express some doubt about how certain Aristotle was on various points, particularly in cosmology and natural (...) science. Nordid Aristotle's detractors in the modern period cease to regard his philosophy as totallydogmatic—though fundamentally mistaken, of course. It was not until German scholarship in the nineteenth century thought it could discern temporal development in Aristotle's approach to a wide variety of questions that the scholastic view ceased to be theestablished wisdom. But now this historical approach has been largely jettisoned, leaving us with an Aristotelian corpus in which we can recognize many doctrinal tensions and doubts that were very likely endemic to Aristotle's thought right to the end of his life. (shrink)

Morgan's canon can be construed as claiming that an intentional explanation of a behavior should be ruled out if there exists an explanation of this behavior in terms of 'lower' mechanisms. Unfortunately, Morgan's conception of higher and lower faculties is based on dubious evolutionary considerations. I examine alternative interpretations of the terms 'higher' and 'lower', and show that none can turn the canon into a principle that is both correct and useful in drawing the line between thinkers and non-thinkers. In (...) the process, I identify a number of problems that an adequate formulation of the canon should avoid. I then consider two more recent versions of the canon, proposed by Elliott Sober and Jonathan Bennett. Both are found unsatisfactory, but I argue that a version of Bennett's unity condition that is restricted to the attribution of recognitional concepts is on the right track. (shrink)

Martin replies to Sciabarra's essay on Rand, Rush, and progressive rock with critical reflections from a Marxist perspective. Focusing on the film version of The Fountainhead, which shares much in common with film noir and Socialist Realism, Martin rejects as reification Rand's emphasis on property as the defining feature of human life. Her dismissal of rock music has overtones of racism and Eurocentrism. The rock band Rush may have drawn inspiration from Howard Roark, but two other real-life role (...) models would have been better suited: Ludwig van Beethoven and Frank Lloyd Wright. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 343 The Education of Desire: Plato and the Philosophy of Religion. By MICHEL DESPLAND. Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1985. Pp. xiv + 395. $45.00 (cloth); $25.00 (paper). Plato, in Professor Despland's considered estimate, is a " philosopher of religion" avant la lettre. Despite their remote antiquity, Despland finds the dialogues a plausible introduction to the admittedly "un-Platonic" twentieth-century philosophical discussion of religion. His premise (...) is that modern philosophy of religion shares, or ought to share, Plato's twin concern for inducing benign social dispositions and for arousing reverent intellectual contemplation-a combination which Despland's compendious yet for the most part plain-spoken scholarship calls "the education of desire." Despland accordingly aims to clarify " the demands for attention that the religious life of Greece presses upon Plato's mind 1and the sort of attention Plato pays to it" (xii). He begins with the Socratic dialogue Euthyphro, which raises but does not resolve the question "What is piety?" Socrates's question is posed during the late fifth-century twilight of Athenian religious traditions, amid the glare of competing practical claims about standards for evaluating right and wrong. Not surprisingly, neither Euthyphro nor Socrates quite embodies the traditional piety to which their conversation purportedly appeals. Euthyphro is one-sided and doctrinaire in his appropriation of the ancestral myths by which he would justify his highly irregular lawsuit against his father for impiety. Socrates, on the other hand, is consistently ironic and, claiming little more than knowledge of his own ignorance, is said to "stake everything on the, it is hoped, well-scrutinized conscience" (31). However this may be, Plato's unsettled and unsettling dialogue on piety indicates the need for philosophy of religion as Despland understands it. Plato (whom Despland would distinguish sharply from Socrates) aims "to rethink the opinions Greeks shared, or disputed, about t.he world or man's place in it" with a view to supplying more positive and lasting answers (57). He takes his bearings by the threefold theology implicit in the Laws. In Book X, Plato's Athenian Stranger asserts inter alia that the gods exist, that they care for human beings, and that they are incorruptible (cf. 907b). Despland attributes the Stranger's assertions to Plato himself, as Plato's innovative, rationally defensible " creed " by which he " seeks to change the minds of human beings with the help of the law and its penalties " (103f). He argues as follows. That the gods are incorruptible is seen to imply a " universal moral economy '' whereby " all souls in the end get their just deserts" (120)-as Socrates maintains in the myth which culminates Plato's Gorgias, whose plot Despland summarizes accordingly. That the gods exist at all suggests "an intelligible order con- 344 BOOK REVIEWS ducive to the human good" (126ff.), an order knowable not simply by analogy with the human cra£ts (as supposed by Socrates in the so-called " earlier " dialogues) but rather by " a sort of austere mystical submission to the Good" (141)-as Despiand shows by interpreting the Republic in the light of the cave image of Book VIL Finally, that the gods care for human beings means that, given " the presence of a cosmic pull that keeps the soul open to transcendent realities and helps it on its way towards them" (165), human desires are not inevitably selfish but are educable or convertible to the desire. for truth-;a doctrine which Despland ascribes to Plato by way of an analysis of Socrates's notion of "divine madness" in the Phaedrus and the adjacent myth comparing the soul to a pair of charioteer-driven winged horses (244e-255c). In Despland's reading, then, Socratic dialectics function above all to support or illustrate the accompanying myths. The dialogues.ther.eby produce "reasoned doctrines " (197). Socratic philosophizing is pressed into the service of a Platonic story-telling designed t.o reshape the popular mores. Plato's subsequent failure to bring about political reform during his own lifetime (whether in Athens or at Syracuse) evidently proved no obstacle to his posthumous influence (e.g., in the tradition of Christian Platonism). Therein lies his perennial interest for philosophers of religion... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Black Natural Law by Vincent W. LloydDaniel A. MorrisBlack Natural Law Vincent W. Lloyd NEW YORK: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2016. XV + 180 PP. $49.95Black Natural Law introduces and analyzes a "tradition" (Vincent Lloyd's term throughout the text) of African American natural law reflection. In so doing, Lloyd dismantles stubborn boundaries between Christian ethics, black religion, and American religious history. Black Christian writers such as (...) Frederick Douglass are often confined to the category of "history" and rarely elevated to esteemed intellectual disciplines such as "theology" and "ethics." Lloyd reverses that tendency. Like Catherine Bell, Robert Orsi, Miguel De La Torre, and others, he makes us question the hierarchical dualism between thought and practice, and our habit of associating white Christianities with the former and nonwhite Christianities with the latter. This book is worth reading for that feature alone. But there are many other worthwhile arguments as well.In his surveys of Frederick Douglass, W.E.B. DuBois, Anna Julia Cooper, and Martin Luther King Jr., Lloyd identifies a coherent tradition of natural law reflection in African American Christianity that imagines a concentric series of laws, including God's law, moral law, and civic law. The tradition emphasizes the image of God in all human beings and thus the "inherent value of human life" (22). Black natural law reflection is distinctive primarily because it is rooted in black experience. At its core, it is informed by experiences of oppression sponsored by the civic law. Critique of ideology (which Lloyd sometimes uses as a synonym for civic/worldly law) is at the heart of black natural law, as is the organizing of social movements as a practical outgrowth of that critique. Lloyd also shows that black natural law sets itself apart from its white/European counterparts by understanding reason and emotion as mutually informing: emotion does and indeed should inform reason in moral reflection. And because God privileges the oppressed, black natural law also emphasizes its own priority over white theological ethics. Through close readings of black theologians, Lloyd pulls all these features together and persuasively shows that there is a coherent tradition of black natural law thinking in American Christianity. This primary argument is clear and indispensable for scholars of either black theology or natural law (or both).Lloyd also makes a provocative historical argument: the tradition began to decline after the civil rights movement and is currently in a state of disarray. He writes that "elements of black natural law continued to be invoked in various [End Page 199] ways during the decades that followed the civil rights movement—invoked in ways that were disconnected from the tradition" (120). He shows that literary, activist, and political uses of natural law ideas within black communities have lost the coherence and distinctive features that they once had. This argument includes innovative interpretations and critiques of James Baldwin, Audre Lorde, Barack Obama, Clarence Thomas, and others. This argument is all the more worthwhile for scholars and students of ethics and American religious history because Lloyd notes that a coherent expression of black natural law could help meet the crisis of mass incarceration.The book could, at times, engage secondary sources more effectively; for example, which natural law theories "focus exclusively on the human capacity to reason" (38)? How have other scholars understood Douglass's invocation of natural law concepts? It also offers an underdeveloped critique of pragmatism. These quarrels are trivial, though, in light of the thought-provoking arguments that Lloyd offers. Scholars working on Christian ethics, American religious thought, and black Christianity should all read this book. Black Natural Law would fit well on upper-level and graduate syllabi in these fields.Daniel A. MorrisAugustana CollegeCopyright © 2017 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

"Understanding Scientific Progress constitutes a potentially enormous and revolutionary advancement in philosophy of science. It deserves to be read and studied by everyone with any interest in or connection with physics or the theory of science. Maxwell cites the work of Hume, Kant, J.S. Mill, Ludwig Bolzmann, Pierre Duhem, Einstein, Henri Poincaré, C.S. Peirce, Whitehead, Russell, Carnap, A.J. Ayer, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend, Nelson Goodman, Bas van Fraassen, and numerous others. He lauds Popper for advancing beyond (...) verificationism and Hume’s problem of induction, but faults both Kuhn and Popper for being unable to show that and how their work could lead nearer to the truth." —Dr. LLOYD EBY teaches philosophy at The George Washington University and The Catholic University of America, in Washington, DC "Maxwell's aim-oriented empiricism is in my opinion a very significant contribution to the philosophy of science. I hope that it will be widely discussed and debated." – ALAN SOKAL, Professor of Physics, New York University "Maxwell takes up the philosophical challenge of how natural science makes progress and provides a superb treatment of the problem in terms of the contrast between traditional conceptions and his own scientifically-informed theory—aim-oriented empiricism. This clear and rigorously-argued work deserves the attention of scientists and philosophers alike, especially those who believe that it is the accumulation of knowledge and technology that answers the question."—LEEMON McHENRY, California State University, Northridge "Maxwell has distilled the finest essence of the scientific enterprise. Science is about making the world a better place. Sometimes science loses its way. The future depends on scientists doing the right things for the right reasons. Maxwell's Aim-Oriented Empiricism is a map to put science back on the right track."—TIMOTHY McGETTIGAN, Professor of Sociology, Colorado State University - Pueblo "Maxwell has a great deal to offer with these important ideas, and deserves to be much more widely recognised than he is. Readers with a background in philosophy of science will appreciate the rigour and thoroughness of his argument, while more general readers will find his aim-oriented rationality a promising way forward in terms of a future sustainable and wise social order."—David Lorimer, Paradigm Explorer, 2017/2 "This is a book about the very core problems of the philosophy of science. The idea of replacing Standard Empiricism with Aim-Oriented Empiricism is understood by Maxwell as the key to the solution of these central problems. Maxwell handles his main tool masterfully, producing a fascinating and important reading to his colleagues in the field. However, Nicholas Maxwell is much more than just a philosopher of science. In the closing part of the book he lets the reader know about his deep concern and possible solutions of the biggest problems humanity is facing."—Professor PEETER MŰŰREPP, Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia “For many years, Maxwell has been arguing that fundamental philosophical problems about scientific progress, especially the problem of induction, cannot be solved granted standard empiricism (SE), a doctrine which, he thinks, most scientists and philosophers of science take for granted. A key tenet of SE is that no permanent thesis about the world can be accepted as a part of scientific knowledge independent of evidence. For a number of reasons, Maxwell argues, we need to adopt a rather different conception of science which he calls aim-oriented empiricism (AOE). This holds that we need to construe physics as accepting, as a part of theoretical scientific knowledge, a hierarchy of metaphysical theses about the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe, which become increasingly insubstantial as we go up the hierarchy. In his book “Understanding Scientific Progress: Aim-Oriented Empiricism”, Maxwell gives a concise and excellent illustration of this view and the arguments supporting it… Maxwell’s book is a potentially important contribution to our understanding of scientific progress and philosophy of science more generally. Maybe it is the time for scientists and philosophers to acknowledge that science has to make metaphysical assumptions concerning the knowability and comprehensibility of the universe. Fundamental philosophical problems about scientific progress, which cannot be solved granted SE, may be solved granted AOE.” Professor SHAN GAO, Shanxi University, China . (shrink)

Recent philosophical attention to climate models has highlighted their weaknesses and uncertainties. Here I address the ways that models gain support through observational data. I review examples of model fit, variety of evidence, and independent support for aspects of the models, contrasting my analysis with that of other philosophers. I also investigate model robustness, which often emerges when comparing climate models simulating the same time period or set of conditions. Starting from Michael Weisberg’s analysis of robustness, I conclude that his (...) approach involves a version of reasoning from variety of evidence, enabling this robustness to be a confirmatory virtue.. (shrink)

climate scientists have been engaged in a decades-long debate over the standing of satellite measurements of the temperature trends of the atmosphere above the surface of the earth. This is especially significant because skeptics of global warming and the greenhouse effect have utilized this debate to spread doubt about global climate models used to predict future states of climate. I use this case from an under-studied science to illustrate two distinct philosophical approaches to the relation among data, scientists, measurement, models, (...) and theory. I argue that distinguishing between 'direct' empiricist and 'complex' empiricist approaches helps us understand and analyze this important scientific episode. I also introduce a complex empiricist account of testing and evaluation, and contrast it with the basic Hypothetico-Deductive approach to the climate models used by the direct empiricists. This more developed complex empiricist apporach will serve philosophy of science well, as computational models become more wide-spread in the sciences. (shrink)

We study a range of issues connected with the idea of replacing one formula by another in a fixed context. The replacement core of a consequence relation ⊢ is the relation holding between a set of formulas {A1,..., Am,...} and a formula B when for every context C, we have C,..., C,... ⊢ C. Section 1 looks at some differences between which inferences are lost on passing to the replacement cores of the classical and intuitionistic consequence relations. For example, we (...) find that while the inference from A and B to \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$A \land B$\end{document}, sanctioned by both these initial consequence relations, is retained on passage to the replacement core in the classical case, it is lost in the intuitionistic case. Further discussion of these two logics occupies Sections 3 and 4. Section 2 looks at the m = 1 case, describing A as replaceable by B according to ⊢ when B is a consequence of A by the replacement core of ⊢, and inquiring as to which choices of ⊢ render this induced replaceability relation symmetric. Section 5 investigates further conceptual refinements— such as a contrast between horizontal and vertical replaceability—suggested by some work of R. B. Angell and R. Harrop in the 1950s and 1960s. Appendix 1 examines a related aspect of term-for-term replacement in connection with identity in predicate logic. Appendix 2 is a repository for proofs which would otherwise clutter up Section 3. (shrink)

Philosophy, as it is understood and practiced in the West, is and has been generally considered to be the search for truth. But even if philosophy is the search for truth, it does not automatically follow that those who are identified as ‘philosophers’ are themselves actually engaged in that search. And indeed, in this paper I argue that many philosophers have in fact not been genuinely engaged in the search for truth (in other words, many philosophers have not been doing (...) philosophy) and as such much of what passes for philosophy is in fact not really philosophy at all. (shrink)

The author takes anderson to task for resting his argument on an "appeal to english usage," without analyzing that usage in relation to his point that subjunctive and counterfactual conditionals belong in one class. (staff).

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Abailard and Non-Things MARTIN M. TWEEDALE On SEVERAL OCCASIONSin his logical writings Abailard extracts himself from embarrassing ontological implications of his analyses of language by resorting to the notion of a something that is not a thing. I shall note here two such occasions and then discuss Abailard's explanations of this procedure based on the grammatical distinction of personal and impersonal constructions. Since the texts on this latter (...) topic are especially confusing, a considerable portion of my effort will be spent on making sense of them as preparation for drawing some conclusions about Abailard's overall approach. My purpose here is to show how Abailard's grammatical analyses are fundamental to his defence of a number of metaphysical positions. I also want to suggest that Abailard's grammatical approach, especially on the question of dicta, contains insights of continuing interest. Not all of Abailard's non-things are particularly associated with analyses of language. For instance, there are the likenesses the mind supposedly constructs for itself in order to think of things that are not being perceived. These Abailard calls fictive things (res ficta), and he refuses to give them the status of real psychological entities. ~ The likenesses are compared to mirror images which Abailard is also willing to treat as non-things. However, I wish to restrict my discussion here to cases which arise from Abailard's analysis of the reference of certain words. One such instance occurs in his discussion of universals. The peculiar nonthing here is the "state" (status), which, Abailard maintains, is "the common cause by which the universal word is imposed"7 Abailard is very careful to dis1Glossae super Porphyrium, in Peter Abelards philosophische,.gchriIten, edited by Geyer (henceforth referred ~o as Geyer), Miinster i. W., 1919 (BGPM, vol. 21), pp. 20-21, ll. 23-32: Intellectus autem sicut nec corporeo indigens instrumento est, ita /nec/ necesse est eum subiectum corpus habere in quod mittatur, sed rei ~dmilitudine contentus est, quam sibi ipse animus conficit, in quam suae intelligentiae actionem dirigit. Unde turr,~ destructa vel remota sensus qui in earn agebat, perit, inteUectus autem permanet rei similitudine auimo retenta. Sigut autem sensus non est res sentita, in quam dirigitur, sic nec intellectus forma est rei quam concipit, sed intellectus actio quaedam est animae, unde intelligens dicitur, forma vero in quam dirigitur, res imaginaria quaedam est et ficta, quam sibi, quando vult et qualm vult, animus conficit.... 11.9-17: Quaero enim, utrum flla quadratura et ilia altitudo vera forma sit intellectus, qui ad similitudinem quantitatis turris ducatur et compositionis eius. Sed profecto vera quadratura et vera altitudo non nisi corporibus insunt, ficta etiam qualitate nec intellectus nec ulla vera essentia forrnari potest. Restat igitur, ut sicut ficta eat qualitas, ficta substantia sit ei subiecta. Fortasae autem et ea speculi imago, quae visui subiecta apparere videtur, nihil esse vere dici potest, quoniam scilicetin alba speguli superficie contrarii coloris qualitas saepe apparet. Ibid., pp. 19-20,II. 14-16- ~ad nunc ea quae breviter tetigimus, diligenter perquiramus, scilicet quae sit iIla communis causa, secundum quam universale nomen impositum est.... 11. 21-29. Singuli homines discreti ab invicem, gum in propriis differant tam essentiis quam formis, ut supra meminimus rei physicam inquirentes, in eo tamen conveniunt, quod homines aunt. Non dico in homine, gum res nulla sit homo uisi discreta, sed in esse hominem. Esse autem hominem non est homo nec res aliqua, si diligentius consideremus, [329] 330 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY tinguish three different questions frequently confused in discussions on universals. The first is "What is 'universal' predicated of?", and the answer is simply words --words not in the sense of mere marks or sounds, but of meaningful marks or sounds. Another is "How do we have an idea associated with universals?" Here the aforementioned likenesses enter as that by which the mind can have an idea applicable to many individuals. But there is also the question of what makes a certain word correctly applicable to many things. Abailard does not make the error of thinking that an idea in the mind or some operation of the mind could possibly be the cause, as some conceptualists seem to think. This would lead to the conclusion that... (shrink)

Since the fundamental challenge that I laid at the doorstep of the pluralists was to defend, with nonderivative models, a strong notion of genic cause, it is fatal that Waters has failed to meet that challenge. Waters agrees with me that there is only a single cause operating in these models, but he argues for a notion of causal `parsing' to sustain the viability of some form of pluralism. Waters and his colleagues have some very interesting and important ideas about (...) the sciences, involving pluralism and parsing or partitioning causes, but they are ideas in search of an example. He thinks he has found an example in the case of hierarchical and genic selection. I think he has not. (shrink)

In this essay Martin Kintzinger takes as his starting point observations on the current debate regarding knowledge and asserts a lack of reflection on the status of knowledge in pre-modern societies. In Sebastian Brant’s work ‘Narrenschiff’ and other contemporary critical writings, Kintzinger finds evidence that the medieval critique of experts was not by necessity a critique of expertise per se. Rather, it often was a critique of an expertise based on purely theoretical book learning, deemed unpractical and inapplicable. Significantly, (...) there existed a counter-conception of an expert who possessed both theoretical knowledge and practical experience and who was deemed practically able to cure disease, or give valuable legal advice etc. Of course, the term experientia was first used in this context only around 1600. But Kintzinger argues that experience-based knowledge, which is associated with inductive inference and the modern natural sciences, was not a product of the early modern period. Rather, the notion of experience as a warrant of true knowledge was heavily rooted in medieval thought. This essay subsequently traces the emergence of the notion of experience to Scholasticism, to the thought of Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great and to the medieval debate on the dualism between the arts and science, and between empiricus and theoricus respectively. (shrink)

Originally published in 1983, Martin Stanton has written an intriguing and original guide to French styles of psychoanalysis. He describes the development of psychoanalytic technique and shows how it has transformed the contemporary French literary and philosophical thought and writing, as well as making inroads in the English-speaking cultural world. He argues that psychoanalysis has outgrown the individual setting and needs to evolve new methods of group work – in this respect, he believes, it has a special role to (...) play in educational institutions. The book examines the grounds on which analysis has evolved subversive and deconstructive strategies and created radical alternatives. It relates the ‘Lacan effect’ on the psychoanalytic movement to long-standing debates on patriarchy and authoritarianism, and considers, in a clinical section, variant diagnoses of paranoia and schizophrenia. It also discusses the future direction of psychoanalysis in the light of contemporary French research. (shrink)

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz war der vielleicht letzte europäische Denker, der das Wissen und den gelehrten Diskurs seiner Zeit noch überblicken konnte. Dabei leitete ihn die Überzeugung, dass die Wahrheit erst in der Pluralität der Perspektiven erfahrbar werde. Dieses ebenso spannungsreiche wie produktive Verhältnis von Einheit und Pluralität erkunden die Autoren der Beiträge auf drei im Leibnizschen Werk eng miteinander verbundenen Gebieten: der Philosophie, der Theologie und dem politischen Denken. Ausgehend von den philosophischen Grundlagen wird die Theologie in Leibniz' Gesamtkonzept der (...) Wissenschaften und besonders angesichts seiner Auseinandersetzung mit der religiösen Pluralität untersucht, seine Bemühungen um die Vereinigung der christlichen Konfessionen und sein Interesse für fremde Religionen und Kulturen. Sein politisches Denken und seine politische Tätigkeit bilden den Prüfstein für die angestrebte Verbindung von Theorie und Praxis. Ein abschließender Blick gilt seiner Rezeption auf diesen Gebieten. Ein Merkmal mehrerer Beiträge ist die präzise Arbeit an Texten zu China, zur Auseinandersetzung mit Thomasius und zum ökumenischen Gespräch, die erst seit kurzem oder noch gar nicht in einer kritischen Edition vorliegen. Mit Beiträgen von: Luca Basso, Friedrich Beiderbeck, Daniel J. Cook, Nora Gädeke, Ursula Goldenbaum, Wenchao Li, Rüdiger Otto, Hans Poser, Patrick Riley, Jaime de Salas, Brigitte Saouma, Heinrich Schepers, Martin Schneider, Lloyd Strickland und Stephan Waldhoff. (shrink)

This paper addresses the phenomenon of incomplete preferences in disaster risk management. If an agent finds two options to be incomparable and thus has an incomplete preference ordering, i.e., neither prefers one option over the other nor finds them equally as good, it is not possible for the agent to perform a value tradeoff, necessary for an informed decision, between these two options. In this paper we suggest a way to model incomplete preference orderings by means of probabilistic preferences, and (...) how to reveal an agent’s incomplete preference ordering within a behaviorist framework. (shrink)

The diverse papers which make up this book are variations on a theme which is based in biological science - yet none of the contributors is really a biologist. Our metaphor for describing what we are doing here is that we have gathered together in a room because that particular room provides us with a certain view of our individual areas of interest - a view that may have been previously obscured. We are visiting the house of biology in the (...) hope that we may see more clearly things that we each find baffling about our particular field of work in education, research, or daily living. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 124.1 (2003) 137-141 [Access article in PDF] Qvomodo Stemma Gladiatoris Pellicvlae More Philologico Sit Constitvendvm Martin M. Winklersive Martinvs Satiricvs Philocinematographicvs [Figures]Poetae rervmqve scriptores et antiqui et recentiores lectoribus fabulas suas sententiis vel versibus bene textis soliti sunt adferre. Sed hodie novum exstat narrandi genus, quod fabulas hominibus adfert praecipue picturis eo modo compositis et inter se coniunctis ut oculi humani imagines singulares celerrime (...) et sine ulla motus intermissione ipsas moveri percipiant, personarum dialogis et arte musica sonisque diversis comitantibus et iuvantibus. Adeo enim progressa est ars magna lucis et umbrae, quam primum photographiam deinde cinematographiam nominare consuevimus, ut fabulae cuiusvis modi—breves longae, novae antiquae, laetificae tragicae—imitatione veri paene perfecta spectatoribus persuadeant tempora iam praeterita in vitam novam esse recreata.In ipsa arte narrandi non multum interest inter eos qui verbis utuntur, ut poetae ac scriptores, et eos qui imaginibus, ut cinematographi. Praeclare Horatium in arte poetica exponenda dixisse recordemur ut picturam poesin esse. Qua in re Simonidem illum Ceum aliosque poetas Graecos secutus est Flaccus noster. Utroque enim modo, et verbis et picturis, auctores antiqui atque hodierni homines docent delectant movent. 1 Facillime ergo intellegimus fabulam cinematographicam genus quoddam esse textus, sed textus non tantum legendi aut audiendi sed imprimis videndi vel spectandi. Peritissimus quisque talium fabularum [End Page 137] auctor omne tulit punctum, nam miscuit utile dulci. Is quoque non aliter ac poeta antiquus aut prodesse vult aut delectare.Sed editiones nonnullarum fabularum cinematographicarum inter se differunt et lacunas corruptelas vitia alia exhibent. Non enim raro pelliculas adfectas esse constat eius generis damno quod textuum antiquorum docti in editionibus suis obelis indicare solent. Itemque quomodo fabulae cinematographicae originem suam trahant ab antiquioribus quaerere et explicare haud absurdum est. 2Ergo editorum usum secutus his paginis originem pelliculae Gladiatoris anno MM editae exempli gratia stemmate quasi philologico explicabo. Deinde stemmatis sigla brevibus adnotationibus percurram. 3 Hoc modo me demonstraturum spero principia artis philologicae, quae litterarum Graecarum Romanarumque docti adhuc solum soliti sunt textibus adhibere, fabulis quoque cinematographicis magno cum fructu admoveri posse. In stemmate infra dato titulos fabularum cinematographicarum et auctorum eorum nomina Latine reddidi.Ridlius Scotus, pelliculae Gladiatoris auctor, magna cum acclamatione publica, minore criticorum, narrare studet quae imp. Caes. M. Aurelii Commodi Antonini Aug. aetate in imperio Romano gesta sunt. Sed stemmate monstrabo Gladiatorem imprimis ortum esse a nonnullis fabulis cinematographicis prioribus, quibus sons aut insons copiosissime usus sit ille Scotus. Qua de causa pellicula eius nobis indicat quemadmodum res Romanae temporibus nostris undique floreant. Cum ipsa et ceterae huius modi fabulae falsa inventione abundare soleant, tamen rerum et linguarum Romanarum Graecarumque magistri hodie hoc artis popularis genere in scholis saepius niti consueverunt, ut discipulos a falsa ad veram adducant rerum gestarum scientiam et rebus antiquis accuratius instruant. Quibus igitur magistris hoc offero stemma, nam amicus Scotus, sed magis amica veritas. 4 [End Page 138] [Begin Page 140] Conspectvs Siglorvm WPellicularum res antiquas tractantium archetypus, qui est summa rerum Romanarum a scriptoribus antiquis et recentioribus expositarum.AConsensus fabularum quae vel litteris vel ludis scaenicis vel picturis cinematographicis praecipue Italicis Americanisque res Romanas narrant depinguntque.TTriumphus Animi Helena Riefenstahle auctore anno MDCCCCXXXV editus. 5SSpartacus Antonio Viro—nomine suppresso—et Stanlio Cubrico auctoribus anno MDCCCCLX editus.CCasus Imperii Romani Antonio Viro auctore anno MDCCCCLXIIII editus. 6B1-3Triga Georgii Lucae Bella Galactica inscripta et annis MDCCCCLXXVII MDCCCCLXXX MDCCCCLXXXIII primum edita, quae his picturis cinematographicis constat: Pars Quarta: "Spes Nova" (B1), Pars Quinta: "Imperium Referit" (B2), Pars Sexta: "Iedi Reversi" (B3). 7 Editio trigae altera anno MDCCCCLXXXXVII edita itemque Bellorum Galacticorum trigae novae Pars Prima: "Simulacri Minae" anni MDCCCCLXXXXVIIII nihil ad rem.M1-3Triga Georgii Molitoris Maximus Furens inscripta, annis MDCCCCLXXVIIII MDCCCCLXXXI MDCCCCLXXXV edita et his picturis cinematographicis constans: Maximus Furens (M1), Maximi Furentis Pars Altera vel Bellator Peregrinans (M2), Maximus Furens Vltra Tonitrus Tholum (M3). 8GGladiator Ridlio Scoto auctore anno MM editus. 9 [End Page 140]His alias poteram et plures subnectere causas vel philologicas vel cinematographicas. Qui de Scoti Gladiatore plurima cognoscere velint... (shrink)

Ritual atonement for Cohen aims exclusively at ethical repentance. Sins, or ethical failures, are regarded as unwitting misdeeds, corrigible once recognized. As individuals continue to vacillate, their need for repentance remains life-long. Rosenzweig, however, considers redemption from sin impossible without recourse to miracles. Individual failures are failures in wish, Rosenzweig implies, rather than failures in deed, as Cohen maintains; hence atonement requires above all the ongoing regulating of wishes through liturgical prayer. "Repentance" (t'shuvah), which for Cohen is the "return" to (...) ethical integrity, is for Rosenzweig the "return" to the daily, weekly, and yearly prayers of the Jewish liturgy. (shrink)

Este trabajo se propone estudiar las características de los paralogismos de composición y división (Retórica II 24.II, 1401a), de la consecuencia (Retórica II 24.VI, 1401b20-30) y de la causa aparente (Retórica II 24.VII, 1401b30-34), de modo de analizar si Eurípides los utiliza en el agón de Andrómaca de los versos 577 a 746 This paper intends to study the characteristics of paralogisms due to composition and division (Rhetoric II 24.II, 1401a), due to consequent (Rhetoric II 24.VI, 1401b20-30), and due to (...) false cause (Rhetoric II 24.VII, 1401b30-34), in order to analyze if Euripides uses them in the agon in Andromache (577-746). (shrink)